Showing posts with label Battle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Battle. Show all posts
Thursday, August 30, 2012
Staff Officer's Duties
Staff Officers of the INDEPENDENT GUARD,
Re: New duties for all staff officers
Gentlemen,
Our battalion has become known as one of the most mobile and well trained battalions in all the hobby and much of this is due to the attention to detail that we have come to expect of our battalion staff officers. However, there are many more duties that we have yet to assume or even attempt to put into use. In pursuit of that I would like this directive to alert you all to the changes and additions to your staff duties that I would like to see added for next season.
Up to this point I, as Colonel, have taken on almost all the miscellaneous duties that I will describe here after but I have noticed that I have lost track of time here and there and have not had the time to pay attention to things like music and the camp, etc. Also, I will be taking on the role of overall commander at more events next season (Jackson and Billie Creek for instance) and will not be available to worry about some of the finer details of the battalion as I will have other duties that will necessarily take me from the battalion at times during the day. I do not want the battalion to hurt for attention to these details as it will tend to erase all the hard work we have put in thus far. We need to continue to evolve or we will stagnate and go fallow.
NEW DUTIES
LT. COL. According to "the 1865 Customs of Service for Officers of the Army", by August V. Kautz (Stackpole Books, $15.95) the Lt. Col. has "no duties specified by law", however Capt. Kautz does caution that the Lt.Col. has similar duties to the Major and is, naturally, second in command to the Colonel. This being the case I would like to specify the duties that the Lt. Col. will have from this point forward within our organization.
A). the Lt. Col. will stand as the officer of the day at all times. It is common for all the officers of companies to be in this pool of manpower in the real army, however, we have yet to get to the point where any of our officers are prepared to assume this duty. Once we get our people used to an officer of the day we might , in the future, add the company captains to this duty. Until then the Lt. Col. will be the permanent officer of the day.
Officer of the day duties will include:
1). Making sure each company has its anachronisms hidden
2). Making sure camp is in order: The nights are quiet for sleep time, camp is not a garbage mess, fire wood is supplied and water is available.
B). The Lt. Col. will make certain that the battalion schedule is followed and that the men are ready in time for specified drill and battle times.
C). With the assistance of the other junior staff officers the Lt. Col. will set the line for battalion parade and place the companies in line and in the order specified by the Colonel commanding. Also, I would like to see this made set for each weekend. Once a company is chosen as first company I feel it should stay as such for both days unless there is a pretty good reason to change the line of march.
D). On the field the Lt. Col. will continue to set the line, assure the direction of march and correct the alignment as well as command the right wing of the battalion as we always have done in the past.
E). The Lt. Col. will relay the direction of march to the Adjutant who will be leading the battalion field music as the musicians usually cannot hear the Colonel¹s direction on the march.
MAJOR
The Major is also to act as the officer of the day, but will not be designated as such in this organization. However, the Major will similarly execute camp duties to assist the Lt. Col. and his duties will include:
A). Assuring that camp musicians are following the battalion schedule.
B). Work with the Adjutant to assure diligent attention to the battalion paperwork.
C). Should we institute a pickett or camp guard schedule the Major will be in charge of this.
D). On the field the Major will continue to set the line, assure the direction of march and correct the alignment as well as command the left wing of the battalion as we always have done in the past.
ADJUTANT The Adjutant has many, many more duties that we have no real need for such as filling out paper work for clothing returns and even treasurer of the battalion funds, but we do need to pay a little more attention to the paper work we do use and the schedule with which we get it done. So, I would like to see the Adjutant assume that all paper work must be finished by 9 AM each morning for the Colonel¹s review and signature at every event.
Also, I would like to see the Adjutant keep a new book which will record the company strength and place in line of march for each weekend. This book should be larger than the pocket books we are all carrying. More like a ledger sized book in which we will record the company strengths, companies in attendance and place in line of march for each event. This book will become a record of activities for the past as well. The Adjutant will also be sure and fill this book out even when not in attendance at a particular event. it will be up to the adjutant to get the proper information to keep this book current. To reiterate the Adjutant¹s duties: A). The Adjutant will lead the battalion parade
B). Assist the Lt. Col. in alignment of the battalion on the field
C). In the line of march the Adjutant will direct the music in direction of march as the music cannot hear the Colonel¹s orders.
D). Prepare the morning paperwork by 9AM each morning.
E). Keep the battalion record ledger.
F). Will post the orders of the day in ink at the command post each morning
SGT. MAJOR The Sgt. Major will be the closest man to the company first Sgts. and will make sure that they are getting their company reports in before 9AM each morning and will assist the Adjutant in that duty. On the field his duties will not change from how we currently utilize the position as field marker in drill and file closer in battle.
Gentlemen, we have a great reputation and I expect to further that by these additions to your duties. I would like to say in closing that I have appreciated all the work you men have put into your jobs over the years. We expect so much more from our staff officers than other battalions in this hobby do and it shows in the ability we display on the field as well as that which we display in schedule. It is all due to you boys and the hard work you put in to this organization. I am proud to be your commander and feel I could not ask for better men for the job.
Yours in service, Warner Todd Huston,
Col. cmmdng the INDEPENDENT GUARD
The Battalion Field Staff- An important But Neglected Role
By Warner Todd Huston
Since the 1980's the battalion formation has been the preferred way to organize and participate in civil war enacting and we have come a long way from the times when such an organization was simply a gaggle of separate companies banded together under one banner. Increasingly, a battalion has become expected to understand the drill manuals of the 1860'¹s with reprints of Hardee's, Casey's and Gilham's as well as a host of others filling the bookshelves of sutlers across the country. We have even had a few books written by knowledgeable hobbyists like Don Heitman and Dom Dal Bello who have parlayed their knowledge into how-to manuals, a sort of drill manual for dummies series! But, one aspect has seemed to evade the attention of many civil war enactment battalions. A properly working and trained battalion field staff.
It seems to many battalion staff members out there that they are finished with their efforts once they get the position and have bought that pretty new uniform. Let us take note of what August Kautz said of officers, " It is a great mistake to suppose that when the commission has been obtained there is nothing more to be done, except to draw the pay and display the uniform. In reality, the field of study has just opened..."(1) Nothing could be more correctly observed nor so often ignored in civil war enacting.
For what reason should we have a fully functional staff in a hobby situation? One reason that might easily be forgotten is simply a need for respect from the men of your battalion for the rank staff members represent. Another is the need for other organizations to respect your battalion because those staff officers are knowledgeable and able men. Surely if the men of your own battalion feel that certain staff members are useless or unnecessary the feeling must be shared by members of other groups. What could undermine the trust, respectability and effectiveness of your battalion faster than to have battalion members and others laughing at your staff behind their backs?
Secondly, without an energetic and learned staff a battalion simply cannot move with alacrity on the field in drill OR in a battle scenario. We have all observed those battalions out there that just don't seem to be able to move quickly. It is often due to the fact that just one man, the Colonel, is trying to get everything going while his subalterns stare off into space. This also hinders the safety of the battalion in relation to the other battalions moving about on the field.
Unfortunately, it is like pulling teeth to ascertain what the Lt. Col., Major, Adjutant and the Sgt. Major are supposed to be doing much of the time by reading the manuals of the day. It IS there but their duties, positions and actions are not too terribly clear. This might, perhaps, account for the general feeling that the positions have little TO do in a civil war battalion as we read those manuals so far removed form the war and its use of those officers. But nothing could be further from the truth. In reality these positions were extremely important to alignment, cohesion and the execution of orders of an Infantry battalion. They definitely were not empty uniforms and, naturally, the Lt. Col., Major, Adjutant and Sgt. Major had to be as knowledgeable about the manuals as the Colonel to assist the Colonel in drill and battle.
The most important job that the staff has on the drill field and in battle is execution of the Colonel's orders for maneuver and the alignment of that formation. Gilham¹s Manual for Volunteers and Militia notes, " The adjutant and sergeant major ... assist the Lt. Col. and Major ... in the maneuvers."(2) This informs us that the field staff must be able to execute the orders of drill and assist the Colonel in that duty.
It was, for instance, the Lt. Col's duty to set the markers to mark the line in most cases. "The Lt. Col. , placing himself in succession in rear of the left guides, will assure them on the direction as they arrive..."(3), and " The Lt. Col. will place a marker abreast with the right guide of the leading company."(4) goes another typical reference in Hardee's. Yet again: "The Lt. Col., placing himself in succession in rear of the left guides, will assure them on the direction as they arrive..."(3) Another citation states, " ...the leading one will move in the direction indicated to him by the Lt. Col."(5) This clearly indicates that the Lt. Col. had specific duties in drill, march and battle.
The Lt. Col. and the Major are, naturally, the commanders of the two halves, or wings, of the battalion; the Lt. Col. the right and the Major the left. The adjutant and Sgt. Major assist the Lt. Col. and Major respectively in those duties. All should be mounted, though this may be difficult and not always necessary in enacting the civil war.
We should address one important thing that is most often done incorrectly in an enactment battalion; echoing commands. As Dom Dal Bello notes in his Parade, Inspection and the Evolutions of the Infantry Battalion, "Members of the companies should remain silent* so that the Battalion Commander can continue to be heard. At most, company commanders warn their men in undertones what movements they are to execute."(6) The reason for this rule is to make certain that the battalion commander's orders are promptly executed by the battalion. If a battalion commander had to wait as umpteen company commanders and first sergeants echoed every order it would take that much longer for those orders to be executed.
No echoing is fine and proper in the calm and quite of the drill field where the Colonel's chief duty is instruction of the battalion but what of battle? In battle this directive can lead to a break down in command if strictly adhered to. It is incumbent upon the battalion staff, then, to develop a working relationship such that the Colonel's orders may be relayed to the men in the din and confusion of battle in a prompt fashion. In battle a Colonel's voice may not be heard from one end of the battalion to the other. Therefore, the staff officers must be paying close attention to their Colonel, keeping an eye on him at all times, and be ready to relay the Colonel's orders to their respective wings (And the company commanders should be watching their wing commanders and not necessarily the company allowing the 1st. Sgt. to command the men). The staff should develop such a working relationship that hand signals might be used, as well as verbal commands affording the Colonel the ability to have command of the wings when separated or together without himself being cut in half to do it!
These are a few of the main points of the use and training of a field staff and the importance of that staff. Certainly, there is much, much more to it than what I delineated here. One has but to thoroughly read the manuals to find that out. Just remember, the field staff is NOT just men in pretty uniforms. They had important and detailed duties and our enactment battalions would increase their abilities and efficiency if we treat these positions with the respect due them.
* Mr. Dal Bello also notes, however, that the execution orders of March and Halt should be echoed by company officers so that the battalion executes these order all at the same time eliminating marching and halting by fits and starts.
Footnotes
1. Customs of Service , Page 191, article 574, by August Kautz (1864)
2. Gilham's Manual for Volunteers and Militia , page 35, section 10
3. Hardee's school of the battalion , Part II, Para 130, Close column by division.
4. Hardee's school of the battalion , Part II, Para 86 to break the companies to the right to march to the left.
5. Hardee's school of the battalion , Part II, Para 97 to march by the left flank.
6. Parade, Inspection and the Evolutions of the Infantry Battalion , 4th Edition, Page 68, On Repeating Commands, by Dom Dal Bello
Since the 1980's the battalion formation has been the preferred way to organize and participate in civil war enacting and we have come a long way from the times when such an organization was simply a gaggle of separate companies banded together under one banner. Increasingly, a battalion has become expected to understand the drill manuals of the 1860'¹s with reprints of Hardee's, Casey's and Gilham's as well as a host of others filling the bookshelves of sutlers across the country. We have even had a few books written by knowledgeable hobbyists like Don Heitman and Dom Dal Bello who have parlayed their knowledge into how-to manuals, a sort of drill manual for dummies series! But, one aspect has seemed to evade the attention of many civil war enactment battalions. A properly working and trained battalion field staff.
It seems to many battalion staff members out there that they are finished with their efforts once they get the position and have bought that pretty new uniform. Let us take note of what August Kautz said of officers, " It is a great mistake to suppose that when the commission has been obtained there is nothing more to be done, except to draw the pay and display the uniform. In reality, the field of study has just opened..."(1) Nothing could be more correctly observed nor so often ignored in civil war enacting.
For what reason should we have a fully functional staff in a hobby situation? One reason that might easily be forgotten is simply a need for respect from the men of your battalion for the rank staff members represent. Another is the need for other organizations to respect your battalion because those staff officers are knowledgeable and able men. Surely if the men of your own battalion feel that certain staff members are useless or unnecessary the feeling must be shared by members of other groups. What could undermine the trust, respectability and effectiveness of your battalion faster than to have battalion members and others laughing at your staff behind their backs?
Secondly, without an energetic and learned staff a battalion simply cannot move with alacrity on the field in drill OR in a battle scenario. We have all observed those battalions out there that just don't seem to be able to move quickly. It is often due to the fact that just one man, the Colonel, is trying to get everything going while his subalterns stare off into space. This also hinders the safety of the battalion in relation to the other battalions moving about on the field.
Unfortunately, it is like pulling teeth to ascertain what the Lt. Col., Major, Adjutant and the Sgt. Major are supposed to be doing much of the time by reading the manuals of the day. It IS there but their duties, positions and actions are not too terribly clear. This might, perhaps, account for the general feeling that the positions have little TO do in a civil war battalion as we read those manuals so far removed form the war and its use of those officers. But nothing could be further from the truth. In reality these positions were extremely important to alignment, cohesion and the execution of orders of an Infantry battalion. They definitely were not empty uniforms and, naturally, the Lt. Col., Major, Adjutant and Sgt. Major had to be as knowledgeable about the manuals as the Colonel to assist the Colonel in drill and battle.
The most important job that the staff has on the drill field and in battle is execution of the Colonel's orders for maneuver and the alignment of that formation. Gilham¹s Manual for Volunteers and Militia notes, " The adjutant and sergeant major ... assist the Lt. Col. and Major ... in the maneuvers."(2) This informs us that the field staff must be able to execute the orders of drill and assist the Colonel in that duty.
It was, for instance, the Lt. Col's duty to set the markers to mark the line in most cases. "The Lt. Col. , placing himself in succession in rear of the left guides, will assure them on the direction as they arrive..."(3), and " The Lt. Col. will place a marker abreast with the right guide of the leading company."(4) goes another typical reference in Hardee's. Yet again: "The Lt. Col., placing himself in succession in rear of the left guides, will assure them on the direction as they arrive..."(3) Another citation states, " ...the leading one will move in the direction indicated to him by the Lt. Col."(5) This clearly indicates that the Lt. Col. had specific duties in drill, march and battle.
The Lt. Col. and the Major are, naturally, the commanders of the two halves, or wings, of the battalion; the Lt. Col. the right and the Major the left. The adjutant and Sgt. Major assist the Lt. Col. and Major respectively in those duties. All should be mounted, though this may be difficult and not always necessary in enacting the civil war.
We should address one important thing that is most often done incorrectly in an enactment battalion; echoing commands. As Dom Dal Bello notes in his Parade, Inspection and the Evolutions of the Infantry Battalion, "Members of the companies should remain silent* so that the Battalion Commander can continue to be heard. At most, company commanders warn their men in undertones what movements they are to execute."(6) The reason for this rule is to make certain that the battalion commander's orders are promptly executed by the battalion. If a battalion commander had to wait as umpteen company commanders and first sergeants echoed every order it would take that much longer for those orders to be executed.
No echoing is fine and proper in the calm and quite of the drill field where the Colonel's chief duty is instruction of the battalion but what of battle? In battle this directive can lead to a break down in command if strictly adhered to. It is incumbent upon the battalion staff, then, to develop a working relationship such that the Colonel's orders may be relayed to the men in the din and confusion of battle in a prompt fashion. In battle a Colonel's voice may not be heard from one end of the battalion to the other. Therefore, the staff officers must be paying close attention to their Colonel, keeping an eye on him at all times, and be ready to relay the Colonel's orders to their respective wings (And the company commanders should be watching their wing commanders and not necessarily the company allowing the 1st. Sgt. to command the men). The staff should develop such a working relationship that hand signals might be used, as well as verbal commands affording the Colonel the ability to have command of the wings when separated or together without himself being cut in half to do it!
These are a few of the main points of the use and training of a field staff and the importance of that staff. Certainly, there is much, much more to it than what I delineated here. One has but to thoroughly read the manuals to find that out. Just remember, the field staff is NOT just men in pretty uniforms. They had important and detailed duties and our enactment battalions would increase their abilities and efficiency if we treat these positions with the respect due them.
* Mr. Dal Bello also notes, however, that the execution orders of March and Halt should be echoed by company officers so that the battalion executes these order all at the same time eliminating marching and halting by fits and starts.
Footnotes
1. Customs of Service , Page 191, article 574, by August Kautz (1864)
2. Gilham's Manual for Volunteers and Militia , page 35, section 10
3. Hardee's school of the battalion , Part II, Para 130, Close column by division.
4. Hardee's school of the battalion , Part II, Para 86 to break the companies to the right to march to the left.
5. Hardee's school of the battalion , Part II, Para 97 to march by the left flank.
6. Parade, Inspection and the Evolutions of the Infantry Battalion , 4th Edition, Page 68, On Repeating Commands, by Dom Dal Bello
Fire by file - Why we should do it less often
By Warner Todd Huston
I have been doing some reading and trying to discover what was the most common way that a battalion utilized firing orders and I have come across some interesting points.
It seems that firing by file was not a popular style of firing among the officer class during the civil war for almost the very same reason it is problematic for us in reenacting.
How many times have we as reenactors ordered a company to fire by file and had the company run through their rounds in seconds flat leaving the company standing there, all unloaded, a perfect target for the enemy to charge? To remedy this in the past I have tried cautioning the company to count to three between sections firing. That way we give enough time between the first file and the last, thereby making sure that at least some of the men are loaded again at the head of the company. Consequently, we are not presenting a totally unloaded company for the enemy in our front to exploit. But this "Fix" is nearly impossible to control as well.
So, the tendency is for the men to fire down the line too fast. Then there ends up being a time when there is no firing at all while the men of the company are reloading leaving the company vulnerable to a charge that could cause them to break and run.
One of the reasons for firing by file was so that a continuous amount of fire was to be popping up and down the line after the initial firing. Remember manuals order that after each file fires, the men are to automatically load and fire at least three rounds on their own. The idea was that once the firing had gone down the 100 man company front the first platoon would be mostly reloaded and will have begun to fire independently creating a desultory fire up and down the company front as each man fires at his own rate. This is fine if you actually have 100 men, but this was uncommon even during the war. And a100 man company is nearly unheard of in reenacting.
Here are a few citations which appear in "The War of the Rebellion: A compilation of the Official Records" (the OR) from some of the general officers of the war on firing orders:
Gereral Rosecrans: "Fire by wings" - OR, I, 42 (3), P 412 General G.K. Warren: Ordered firing by ranks - OR,I,42,(2), P 343-334 General Beauregard: firing by file "excited the troops and renders their subsequent control difficult". Recommended the fire by wing or fire by company instead- OR,I, 10 (2), P 326
Confederate Major William Baird explained to a military commission after the Maryland campaign that it was "almost impossible" to get untrained, inexperienced men to fire by volleys because the men got so excited in battle that they fired any which way they could. Here the Major is proving that he conceived veteran soldiers as being more effective because they were under control and firing deliberately in volleys at the command of their trained offices. (OR, I, 19 (1), P 608)
As Major Baird realized, men firing under their own initiative are harder to coordinate within the company. They are concentrating on their own, individual action of loading and firing and have less attention available to give to officer's orders. This we see on the reenacting field all the time. Once an independent fire is ordered it can be very difficult to gain the company's attention when the officer wishes to change the firing order, move the men or make any other order.
So, as Colonel I will try to avoid firing by file more often from this point forward. It causes the men to fire too quickly, presents a vulnerable front of men unloaded and causes the men to be harder to control as they load and fire on their own making them unmindful of their officer's orders. I believe it will make the men more responsive on the field to orders for movement from their officers, will present constantly loaded arms to the front and will also have the effect of making our ammunition supply last longer in battle.
The last point cannot be stressed too much. We have another problem in reenacting where we run out of ammo too quickly. During the war the men were usually issued 40 to 60 rounds and often did not fire all of those. In this hobby we fire way more than that all too often and still run out at times on the field. If we are firing by more deliberate methods we will cause the men to fire less often per man and with better effect in massed volleys of wings, ranks or companies.
Please consider these ideas for future events in your own companies. Try them out and see how well they do.
I have been doing some reading and trying to discover what was the most common way that a battalion utilized firing orders and I have come across some interesting points.
It seems that firing by file was not a popular style of firing among the officer class during the civil war for almost the very same reason it is problematic for us in reenacting.
How many times have we as reenactors ordered a company to fire by file and had the company run through their rounds in seconds flat leaving the company standing there, all unloaded, a perfect target for the enemy to charge? To remedy this in the past I have tried cautioning the company to count to three between sections firing. That way we give enough time between the first file and the last, thereby making sure that at least some of the men are loaded again at the head of the company. Consequently, we are not presenting a totally unloaded company for the enemy in our front to exploit. But this "Fix" is nearly impossible to control as well.
So, the tendency is for the men to fire down the line too fast. Then there ends up being a time when there is no firing at all while the men of the company are reloading leaving the company vulnerable to a charge that could cause them to break and run.
One of the reasons for firing by file was so that a continuous amount of fire was to be popping up and down the line after the initial firing. Remember manuals order that after each file fires, the men are to automatically load and fire at least three rounds on their own. The idea was that once the firing had gone down the 100 man company front the first platoon would be mostly reloaded and will have begun to fire independently creating a desultory fire up and down the company front as each man fires at his own rate. This is fine if you actually have 100 men, but this was uncommon even during the war. And a100 man company is nearly unheard of in reenacting.
Here are a few citations which appear in "The War of the Rebellion: A compilation of the Official Records" (the OR) from some of the general officers of the war on firing orders:
Gereral Rosecrans: "Fire by wings" - OR, I, 42 (3), P 412 General G.K. Warren: Ordered firing by ranks - OR,I,42,(2), P 343-334 General Beauregard: firing by file "excited the troops and renders their subsequent control difficult". Recommended the fire by wing or fire by company instead- OR,I, 10 (2), P 326
Confederate Major William Baird explained to a military commission after the Maryland campaign that it was "almost impossible" to get untrained, inexperienced men to fire by volleys because the men got so excited in battle that they fired any which way they could. Here the Major is proving that he conceived veteran soldiers as being more effective because they were under control and firing deliberately in volleys at the command of their trained offices. (OR, I, 19 (1), P 608)
As Major Baird realized, men firing under their own initiative are harder to coordinate within the company. They are concentrating on their own, individual action of loading and firing and have less attention available to give to officer's orders. This we see on the reenacting field all the time. Once an independent fire is ordered it can be very difficult to gain the company's attention when the officer wishes to change the firing order, move the men or make any other order.
So, as Colonel I will try to avoid firing by file more often from this point forward. It causes the men to fire too quickly, presents a vulnerable front of men unloaded and causes the men to be harder to control as they load and fire on their own making them unmindful of their officer's orders. I believe it will make the men more responsive on the field to orders for movement from their officers, will present constantly loaded arms to the front and will also have the effect of making our ammunition supply last longer in battle.
The last point cannot be stressed too much. We have another problem in reenacting where we run out of ammo too quickly. During the war the men were usually issued 40 to 60 rounds and often did not fire all of those. In this hobby we fire way more than that all too often and still run out at times on the field. If we are firing by more deliberate methods we will cause the men to fire less often per man and with better effect in massed volleys of wings, ranks or companies.
Please consider these ideas for future events in your own companies. Try them out and see how well they do.
I GOT YOU ... NO YOU DIDN'T!! How can we solve the hit taking problem?
By Warner Todd Huston
When we were all boys playing at Cowboys and Indians every battle ended up grinding to a halt with the argument of just who was shot and who was not. Since no one wanted to be dead, the question usually went unresolved. Then we grew up... and now every civil war battle reenactment ends with BOTH sides complaining that the other side did not take any hits. Oh, sure there is always that one silly unit that seems to specialize in taking mass hits from artillery resulting in 90% causalities but it seems that we have not advanced very far since our childhood days of the never empty six shooter and the enemy that always seems to be shooting high. Why is this so? Why can't we seem to arrive at a satisfactory level of causalities based upon civil war tactics, arms effectiveness and number of troops involved?
I believe that we are all suffering from several deficiencies. First, we do not have an accepted process for assessing hits. Second, we have a thorough lack of knowledge of how battles were waged. And third, we lack an understanding of how effective the muskets and artillery that we are to be reacting to really were. I hope to address these points and help to establish some solutions
OUR PAST WAYS
Over the years several methods for taking hits have been employed at one event or another. One idea used in the past is the process of putting a black colored cartridge in the cartridge box of each Infantryman to assess causalities. With this idea, when a man pulls the black cartridge from his box in battle he fires it and takes a hit all on his honor. There is no guarantee, however, that the individual man will, indeed, take his hit and no way to verify the compliance of such a system. The black cartridge idea also abrogates the actual conditions on the field killing too many troops or not enough at all the wrong times. Other events have created scenarios so overly complicated that they tell the commanders how many hits to take and at what stage of the battle to do so, sometimes down to the minute. These overly written scenarios rely too heavily upon the commanders remembering the entire script and it's timing. I am sure that we ALL have participated in events where the plan went horribly awry leaving the commanders to "wing it". That is when all hits cease and it is every man for himself. Lastly, we have the old standby system of leaving the causality rates up to the individual reenactor. With this old system we have a random mix of taking hits or not taking hits as the whim of the reenactor dictates. Consequently, relying wholly on the decision of the individual man to take a hit is the least reliable way to simulate battle causalities. It appears that leaving hit taking up to each individual without supervision is the most common way events are operated. Still, we have yet to arrive at a reliable way to take the hits needed to portray a battle in progress. It is quite amusing, though, to note all the old veterans of 6 or more years in the hobby being the first to take hits while those who have less time in seem to go on forever. It seems that shooting the ol' musket does not hold the same fascination to the old timers as it does for the rest, does it? I have often wondered one thing about the guys who fire only two or three rounds before taking a hit, though. Are your muskets any cleaner, really?
WHAT ARE THE FACTORS?
To begin to create a formula for assessing battle causalities we must go back to the history books and look at the causality rates suffered by the contending forces and calculate what an average battle loss might be for engaged troops of the war. We need to look at army and corps losses to determine what a simulated total causality rate for a reenacted battle would be as well as company losses to determine what each company might loose. That is not the only factor in determining a causality rate, however. We also have to factor in the tactics, number of opposing troops, placement of artillery and, finally, the distances from which directed fire is being taken.
We should start by correcting one enduring myth of the civil war. I am sure that you have all read at one time or another that the civil war was the "first of the modern wars" based on the fact that the rifle musket was the chief infantry arm of the war. At first thought the idea has some merit as the tactics employed by the armies using Napoleonic formations of massed columns of attack were based upon the use of the smooth bore musket. A smooth bore musket is hardly accurate over 80 yards and the principle was that the contending forces would march toward each other as close as they dare, deliver a volley or two of fire and rush in to decide the conflict with the bayonet and hand to hand combat. Ostensibly, the rifle musket is supposed to be accurate to 300 or even 400 yards. Consequently, massed columns of attack should be ruined by the distance this firearm can achieve way before the bayonet can be utilized. The accepted axiom, therefore, is that the tactics used were obsolete with the use of the rile musket and that is why we have such shocking rates of battle loss. We are left to imagine that civil war causality lists far exceed those of previous wars because of this incompatibility of tactics and weapons.
But is it true that the civil war was the first war to use long range and accurate rifle fire, thereby counting grossly larger battle causalities then ever before? Let us consider that European conflicts using smooth bore muskets in the 1850's and earlier such as Solferino in 1859, where over 40,000 causalities among three armies were racked up in just 12 hours, had shocking totals as well. Borodino in 1812 had losses of over 75,000 and in the biggest Napoleonic battle of it's time, the battle of Leipzig in 1813, the loses climbed to 127,000 in three days. These are just as shocking as the totals in our war, even more so for single battles. So, we must learn two things from history to solve our problem. How were the tactics of the war employed and just what is the effective distance of the rifle musket and the limitations of it's use?
The battle tactics of the civil war did not take advantage of long distance rifle fire, that much can be asserted without a doubt. Napoleonic principles were still being employed within the tactical manuals during our war. Commanders were taught that the enemy could not resist a massed charge if delivered correctly. The war with Mexico drove this concept home in our country as the Mexican forces were barely an impediment to further advance during most all the battles of that war and this is where many of the senior commanders of the civil war received their battlefield training. Additionally, the continued use of the muzzle loading rifle by the standing armies of the United States and it's single shot capabilities argued effectively for the use of massed ranks to continue being employed. Consequently, the officers of the civil war typically withheld fire until the enemy was much closer than was necessary for the rifle musket to be effective. In his book Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Paddy Griffith asserts that the average distance that an Infantry fire fight was conducted ranged between 40 and 150 yards. He further states that at very few times do battle records claim that any mass firing was done at farther distances; those over 200 yards. Obviously Infantry firing was not generally done at longer distances over 150 yards and the supposed long distance accuracy of the Springfield and Enfield rifle musket was not a factor in the tactics employed by the armies in most cases and was not a factor in their tactical thinking.
A recent article assessing the ballistic abilities of modern replicas of the Springfield and Enfield rifles was published in the Shooting Times (May 1999) and the results shed further light on the use of these weapons during field conditions. In this article field editor Mike Venturino's tests prove that the firearms that we have been told were so accurate at such long distances are not nearly so effective as historians have contended or imagined by pure statistics of design. He tested the long distance accuracy of these arms by placing a man sized target of plywood at 300 yards and fired 10 rounds at the target. With those ten rounds he was able to connect three out of ten times from a sand bag bench rest with the Enfield (a Navy Arms model 1853) but only one with the Springfield (a Dixie gun works model 1861). Now, remember, this was from a bench rest not held free handed. Mr. Venturino also tested a shorter distance of 100 yards with these weapons. He was able to consistently get a 3 1/4 inch grouping with the Enfield and a 5 inch grouping with the Springfield. However, he made several concessions for accuracy that were not available to the civil war soldier concessions which would alter such accuracy in a tremendous way. He wet swabbed and dry swabbed the barrels after every three shots, every minnie ball was well greased with bullet lubricant AND all shots were made from a bench rest. This was not and could have been done by the soldier in the civil war. Each round fired by the civil war soldier was not lubricated and the barrels were not cleaned of fouling until after the battle ended. (With the exception of the "William's cleaner" round whose purpose was to clean out the musket while being fired. The effectiveness of this round is in question, however, and it was not a Confederate issue item.) So, if we factor in the actual firing conditions of the civil war soldier and add the psychological stress that the soldier would be under his accuracy rate must certainly decline precipitously. Additionally, target practice was not an aspect of the training of the average civil war soldier as use of cartridges outside of battle were usually charged to the regiment or, even, the individual soldier himself. Sure the soldier was shown how to load and fire but improvements in the accuracy of the soldier's ability to hit a target was not considered a part of his training. This is why you may recall in reading accounts of the war that many officers were often heard to caution their men to aim low in battle so that their rounds would not sail harmlessly over their enemies heads.
BATTLE CAUSALITY STATISTICS
Knowledge of real battle losses during the war is another item that must be understood before a formula for assessing causalities in the hobby can be attained. A quick perusal of average losses per company in most battles will show that companies rarely lost more than 4 or 5 to Killed in action and 8 or so wounded out of the average 80 or so men that they went in with. If we can use 80 men as an average number then we have 13 removed from active service after a battle. This is under a 20% loss. Certainly we can all find times when a company had 50% or more causalities, but these were the exception rather than the rule. Additionally we see that there is an average of 20% losses in most major battles for the contending forces, as well. For instance, both Polk's and Hardee's wings in the battle of Perryville, KY lost around 20% during the battle. And while U.S. commander Lytle had 32% lost the Federal armies lost a total of less than 20%. A few more battles for comparison: At Shiloh the U.S forces lost 16% and the C.S. lost 24%; during the seven days battles the Federals lost about 11% and the Confederates lost 20%; at Fredericksburg the U.S. lost 11% of it's forces and the C.S. forces suffered a 6% loss;at Murfeesboro the U.S. lost 22% and the C.S. lost 26%; at Gettysburg we see the Federals loosing 22% and the Confederates loosing 30% and at Chickamagua the U.S. lost 20% and the C.S. 25%. We get an average loss of 14% for the Federal forces and a loss of about 24% for the Confederates during the war. (Statistics from Attack and Die, by McWhiney and Jamieson)
So, what does this mean for us on a reenacted battlefield? Using these statistics we might assume that out of an average company of 25 reenactors we would not loose more than four guys in an average battle. Perhaps one dead and three wounded. A far cry from the masses of dead that many of us assume that we should see on the field. Additionally, we must assume that losses should be held to an overall loss of 20% at the end of the battle.
MORE CONSIDERATIONS
Now that we have a basic rule of thumb of 20% losses during a battle arrived at how and when do we take these hits? Certainly when we operate our battles at distances between 50 and 100 yards we should begin to assess these causalities at those times. But we should also realize that we need to hold our fire until this distance is realized. Therefore, we should assume no causalities early in the movement and take them when we get closer. Further, we need to take in to consideration the forces confronting us. Skirmishers should inflict few and receive few hits while massed infantry should absorb most of the hits from other massed infantry.
Artillery should not mow whole companies down unless they are only 50 yards distant in a recreated battle, either. Artillery was much more a psychological factor to infantry than a directly damaging one it should be remembered. Artillery underwent the same advance in accuracy and distance as did the infantry long arm during the civil war era but the tactics still did not take advantage of this ability. It was generally accepted in the artillery that if you could not see it you could not hit it. Air and radio direction for the long distance firing of artillery was still in the future and artillery was more often used in the closer quarters of 1,000 yards using canister to thin the enemy's ranks than otherwise. In other words, artillery against artillery was not the main use of the arm during the war as it seems to be used in the hobby of battle reenactments. Especially on the Confederate side as their artillery corps had less advantage for long distance than their Federal counterparts.
I would hope it goes without saying that groups of 6 or 8 men would not stand pat in the face of several companies oncoming, either. Sometimes we see on our reenactment fields a slight lack of understanding of force against force. It absolutely must be drilled into all of our heads that battles were usually conducted in a see-saw, back and forth manner. But that is another story, I think
And what about cavalry? I would endeavor to say that infantry should never take more than one hit, what ever the size of the infantry force, from a band of cavalry. Cavalrymen were smart enough to realize that an attack on static massed infantry was suicide and a cavalry against infantry charge happened so infrequently as to be not worth mentioning or doing much on a reenactment field. Certainly we should not see horsemen coming too close to a standing body of infantrymen in this hobby unless these reenactors are adept at falling off their animals.
Another thing to keep in mind is that we operate in a scaled down version of civil war engagements. Where real civil war companies had between 60 and 100 men we have less. Where they had battles encompassing hundreds of acres, we do not. we must try to remember to scale our thinking down to the proper size.
WHO ASSESSES THE CAUSALITIES?
Now we come to the last and most important question, who is the one who apportions the causalities on a reenacted battle field? It is absolutely and completely up to the officer in charge of the battalion or, lacking a battalion organization on the field, the company officer to decide the amount of causalities and make the men of his organization take the hits needed. We cannot expect the men to have all these factors in their heads during a battle. Safety, firing their muskets and listening to their officers is all they should be charged with. We cannot expect the overall battle commanders to be everywhere at once on a field to make sure hits are taken, either. Only the battalion commander in charge (or company commander in the absence of a battalion organization on the field) can effectively assess the resistance he is up against, the type of arms he is facing and the distance from which he is taking enemy fire. It is up to that man to tell company commanders how many hits to take using the criteria enumerated above.
We should be able to rely upon a battalion commander to have the ability to to undertake this task. After all, he is the one in charge of his men, has taken the time necessary to learn the rudiments of battalion evolution and has the position, command experience and the area of the field in his front under direct supervision putting him in the perfect position to be able to assess causalities.
In conclusion, we need to train all battalion and company commanders in these procedures if we expect to begin seeing realistic reenacted battlefield causalities at our battles.
When we were all boys playing at Cowboys and Indians every battle ended up grinding to a halt with the argument of just who was shot and who was not. Since no one wanted to be dead, the question usually went unresolved. Then we grew up... and now every civil war battle reenactment ends with BOTH sides complaining that the other side did not take any hits. Oh, sure there is always that one silly unit that seems to specialize in taking mass hits from artillery resulting in 90% causalities but it seems that we have not advanced very far since our childhood days of the never empty six shooter and the enemy that always seems to be shooting high. Why is this so? Why can't we seem to arrive at a satisfactory level of causalities based upon civil war tactics, arms effectiveness and number of troops involved?
I believe that we are all suffering from several deficiencies. First, we do not have an accepted process for assessing hits. Second, we have a thorough lack of knowledge of how battles were waged. And third, we lack an understanding of how effective the muskets and artillery that we are to be reacting to really were. I hope to address these points and help to establish some solutions
OUR PAST WAYS
Over the years several methods for taking hits have been employed at one event or another. One idea used in the past is the process of putting a black colored cartridge in the cartridge box of each Infantryman to assess causalities. With this idea, when a man pulls the black cartridge from his box in battle he fires it and takes a hit all on his honor. There is no guarantee, however, that the individual man will, indeed, take his hit and no way to verify the compliance of such a system. The black cartridge idea also abrogates the actual conditions on the field killing too many troops or not enough at all the wrong times. Other events have created scenarios so overly complicated that they tell the commanders how many hits to take and at what stage of the battle to do so, sometimes down to the minute. These overly written scenarios rely too heavily upon the commanders remembering the entire script and it's timing. I am sure that we ALL have participated in events where the plan went horribly awry leaving the commanders to "wing it". That is when all hits cease and it is every man for himself. Lastly, we have the old standby system of leaving the causality rates up to the individual reenactor. With this old system we have a random mix of taking hits or not taking hits as the whim of the reenactor dictates. Consequently, relying wholly on the decision of the individual man to take a hit is the least reliable way to simulate battle causalities. It appears that leaving hit taking up to each individual without supervision is the most common way events are operated. Still, we have yet to arrive at a reliable way to take the hits needed to portray a battle in progress. It is quite amusing, though, to note all the old veterans of 6 or more years in the hobby being the first to take hits while those who have less time in seem to go on forever. It seems that shooting the ol' musket does not hold the same fascination to the old timers as it does for the rest, does it? I have often wondered one thing about the guys who fire only two or three rounds before taking a hit, though. Are your muskets any cleaner, really?
WHAT ARE THE FACTORS?
To begin to create a formula for assessing battle causalities we must go back to the history books and look at the causality rates suffered by the contending forces and calculate what an average battle loss might be for engaged troops of the war. We need to look at army and corps losses to determine what a simulated total causality rate for a reenacted battle would be as well as company losses to determine what each company might loose. That is not the only factor in determining a causality rate, however. We also have to factor in the tactics, number of opposing troops, placement of artillery and, finally, the distances from which directed fire is being taken.
We should start by correcting one enduring myth of the civil war. I am sure that you have all read at one time or another that the civil war was the "first of the modern wars" based on the fact that the rifle musket was the chief infantry arm of the war. At first thought the idea has some merit as the tactics employed by the armies using Napoleonic formations of massed columns of attack were based upon the use of the smooth bore musket. A smooth bore musket is hardly accurate over 80 yards and the principle was that the contending forces would march toward each other as close as they dare, deliver a volley or two of fire and rush in to decide the conflict with the bayonet and hand to hand combat. Ostensibly, the rifle musket is supposed to be accurate to 300 or even 400 yards. Consequently, massed columns of attack should be ruined by the distance this firearm can achieve way before the bayonet can be utilized. The accepted axiom, therefore, is that the tactics used were obsolete with the use of the rile musket and that is why we have such shocking rates of battle loss. We are left to imagine that civil war causality lists far exceed those of previous wars because of this incompatibility of tactics and weapons.
But is it true that the civil war was the first war to use long range and accurate rifle fire, thereby counting grossly larger battle causalities then ever before? Let us consider that European conflicts using smooth bore muskets in the 1850's and earlier such as Solferino in 1859, where over 40,000 causalities among three armies were racked up in just 12 hours, had shocking totals as well. Borodino in 1812 had losses of over 75,000 and in the biggest Napoleonic battle of it's time, the battle of Leipzig in 1813, the loses climbed to 127,000 in three days. These are just as shocking as the totals in our war, even more so for single battles. So, we must learn two things from history to solve our problem. How were the tactics of the war employed and just what is the effective distance of the rifle musket and the limitations of it's use?
The battle tactics of the civil war did not take advantage of long distance rifle fire, that much can be asserted without a doubt. Napoleonic principles were still being employed within the tactical manuals during our war. Commanders were taught that the enemy could not resist a massed charge if delivered correctly. The war with Mexico drove this concept home in our country as the Mexican forces were barely an impediment to further advance during most all the battles of that war and this is where many of the senior commanders of the civil war received their battlefield training. Additionally, the continued use of the muzzle loading rifle by the standing armies of the United States and it's single shot capabilities argued effectively for the use of massed ranks to continue being employed. Consequently, the officers of the civil war typically withheld fire until the enemy was much closer than was necessary for the rifle musket to be effective. In his book Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Paddy Griffith asserts that the average distance that an Infantry fire fight was conducted ranged between 40 and 150 yards. He further states that at very few times do battle records claim that any mass firing was done at farther distances; those over 200 yards. Obviously Infantry firing was not generally done at longer distances over 150 yards and the supposed long distance accuracy of the Springfield and Enfield rifle musket was not a factor in the tactics employed by the armies in most cases and was not a factor in their tactical thinking.
A recent article assessing the ballistic abilities of modern replicas of the Springfield and Enfield rifles was published in the Shooting Times (May 1999) and the results shed further light on the use of these weapons during field conditions. In this article field editor Mike Venturino's tests prove that the firearms that we have been told were so accurate at such long distances are not nearly so effective as historians have contended or imagined by pure statistics of design. He tested the long distance accuracy of these arms by placing a man sized target of plywood at 300 yards and fired 10 rounds at the target. With those ten rounds he was able to connect three out of ten times from a sand bag bench rest with the Enfield (a Navy Arms model 1853) but only one with the Springfield (a Dixie gun works model 1861). Now, remember, this was from a bench rest not held free handed. Mr. Venturino also tested a shorter distance of 100 yards with these weapons. He was able to consistently get a 3 1/4 inch grouping with the Enfield and a 5 inch grouping with the Springfield. However, he made several concessions for accuracy that were not available to the civil war soldier concessions which would alter such accuracy in a tremendous way. He wet swabbed and dry swabbed the barrels after every three shots, every minnie ball was well greased with bullet lubricant AND all shots were made from a bench rest. This was not and could have been done by the soldier in the civil war. Each round fired by the civil war soldier was not lubricated and the barrels were not cleaned of fouling until after the battle ended. (With the exception of the "William's cleaner" round whose purpose was to clean out the musket while being fired. The effectiveness of this round is in question, however, and it was not a Confederate issue item.) So, if we factor in the actual firing conditions of the civil war soldier and add the psychological stress that the soldier would be under his accuracy rate must certainly decline precipitously. Additionally, target practice was not an aspect of the training of the average civil war soldier as use of cartridges outside of battle were usually charged to the regiment or, even, the individual soldier himself. Sure the soldier was shown how to load and fire but improvements in the accuracy of the soldier's ability to hit a target was not considered a part of his training. This is why you may recall in reading accounts of the war that many officers were often heard to caution their men to aim low in battle so that their rounds would not sail harmlessly over their enemies heads.
BATTLE CAUSALITY STATISTICS
Knowledge of real battle losses during the war is another item that must be understood before a formula for assessing causalities in the hobby can be attained. A quick perusal of average losses per company in most battles will show that companies rarely lost more than 4 or 5 to Killed in action and 8 or so wounded out of the average 80 or so men that they went in with. If we can use 80 men as an average number then we have 13 removed from active service after a battle. This is under a 20% loss. Certainly we can all find times when a company had 50% or more causalities, but these were the exception rather than the rule. Additionally we see that there is an average of 20% losses in most major battles for the contending forces, as well. For instance, both Polk's and Hardee's wings in the battle of Perryville, KY lost around 20% during the battle. And while U.S. commander Lytle had 32% lost the Federal armies lost a total of less than 20%. A few more battles for comparison: At Shiloh the U.S forces lost 16% and the C.S. lost 24%; during the seven days battles the Federals lost about 11% and the Confederates lost 20%; at Fredericksburg the U.S. lost 11% of it's forces and the C.S. forces suffered a 6% loss;at Murfeesboro the U.S. lost 22% and the C.S. lost 26%; at Gettysburg we see the Federals loosing 22% and the Confederates loosing 30% and at Chickamagua the U.S. lost 20% and the C.S. 25%. We get an average loss of 14% for the Federal forces and a loss of about 24% for the Confederates during the war. (Statistics from Attack and Die, by McWhiney and Jamieson)
So, what does this mean for us on a reenacted battlefield? Using these statistics we might assume that out of an average company of 25 reenactors we would not loose more than four guys in an average battle. Perhaps one dead and three wounded. A far cry from the masses of dead that many of us assume that we should see on the field. Additionally, we must assume that losses should be held to an overall loss of 20% at the end of the battle.
MORE CONSIDERATIONS
Now that we have a basic rule of thumb of 20% losses during a battle arrived at how and when do we take these hits? Certainly when we operate our battles at distances between 50 and 100 yards we should begin to assess these causalities at those times. But we should also realize that we need to hold our fire until this distance is realized. Therefore, we should assume no causalities early in the movement and take them when we get closer. Further, we need to take in to consideration the forces confronting us. Skirmishers should inflict few and receive few hits while massed infantry should absorb most of the hits from other massed infantry.
Artillery should not mow whole companies down unless they are only 50 yards distant in a recreated battle, either. Artillery was much more a psychological factor to infantry than a directly damaging one it should be remembered. Artillery underwent the same advance in accuracy and distance as did the infantry long arm during the civil war era but the tactics still did not take advantage of this ability. It was generally accepted in the artillery that if you could not see it you could not hit it. Air and radio direction for the long distance firing of artillery was still in the future and artillery was more often used in the closer quarters of 1,000 yards using canister to thin the enemy's ranks than otherwise. In other words, artillery against artillery was not the main use of the arm during the war as it seems to be used in the hobby of battle reenactments. Especially on the Confederate side as their artillery corps had less advantage for long distance than their Federal counterparts.
I would hope it goes without saying that groups of 6 or 8 men would not stand pat in the face of several companies oncoming, either. Sometimes we see on our reenactment fields a slight lack of understanding of force against force. It absolutely must be drilled into all of our heads that battles were usually conducted in a see-saw, back and forth manner. But that is another story, I think
And what about cavalry? I would endeavor to say that infantry should never take more than one hit, what ever the size of the infantry force, from a band of cavalry. Cavalrymen were smart enough to realize that an attack on static massed infantry was suicide and a cavalry against infantry charge happened so infrequently as to be not worth mentioning or doing much on a reenactment field. Certainly we should not see horsemen coming too close to a standing body of infantrymen in this hobby unless these reenactors are adept at falling off their animals.
Another thing to keep in mind is that we operate in a scaled down version of civil war engagements. Where real civil war companies had between 60 and 100 men we have less. Where they had battles encompassing hundreds of acres, we do not. we must try to remember to scale our thinking down to the proper size.
WHO ASSESSES THE CAUSALITIES?
Now we come to the last and most important question, who is the one who apportions the causalities on a reenacted battle field? It is absolutely and completely up to the officer in charge of the battalion or, lacking a battalion organization on the field, the company officer to decide the amount of causalities and make the men of his organization take the hits needed. We cannot expect the men to have all these factors in their heads during a battle. Safety, firing their muskets and listening to their officers is all they should be charged with. We cannot expect the overall battle commanders to be everywhere at once on a field to make sure hits are taken, either. Only the battalion commander in charge (or company commander in the absence of a battalion organization on the field) can effectively assess the resistance he is up against, the type of arms he is facing and the distance from which he is taking enemy fire. It is up to that man to tell company commanders how many hits to take using the criteria enumerated above.
We should be able to rely upon a battalion commander to have the ability to to undertake this task. After all, he is the one in charge of his men, has taken the time necessary to learn the rudiments of battalion evolution and has the position, command experience and the area of the field in his front under direct supervision putting him in the perfect position to be able to assess causalities.
In conclusion, we need to train all battalion and company commanders in these procedures if we expect to begin seeing realistic reenacted battlefield causalities at our battles.
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